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Abstract
Because the cost of health care is increasing, more Americans are relying on
crowdfunding to finance their health care expenses. Health care crowdfunding occurs when
people seek donations through online crowdfunding platforms to pay for their health care costs.
This thesis seeks to use theories in charitable giving and health care crowdfunding to understand
if crowdfunding dollars are going to the people who need them most. Low-income individuals in
non-Medicaid expansion states and patients with chronic diseases are not adequately covered by
the private insurance market, thus they require the most need. However, donors evaluate need
subjectively and are more likely to donate to those who are like them. As such, statistically
analyzing GoFundMe campaigns reveals that crowdfunding campaigns for low-income
individuals and chronically ill patients are less successful. These finding contribute to charitable
giving literature in contextualizing a modern phenomenon within a rich body of private provision
for basic goods theories. Moreover, they contribute to the health care crowdfunding literature by
being the first study to test whether health care crowdfunding is addressing people with the
greatest need for it. The implications for these findings are that health care crowdfunding falls
short of addressing the market frictions of private insurance markets. Thus, crowdfunding is not
a sustainable solution.
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I. Introduction
Recently the use of health care crowdfunding to finance individual health care expenses
has increased. The fact that people are willing to resort to this mode of alternative financing is
intriguing, because health care is a basic right, yet not everyone can access it. Thus, this thesis
tries to understand whether this phenomenon is a response to addressing the market failures in
the American health care market. Using GoFundMe data, I find that the data does not support the
hypothesis that health care crowdfunding addresses market failure. Rather, the data suggest that
health care crowdfunding perpetuates the failures.
In doing so, this thesis contributes to the extensive charitable giving literature and the
limited health care crowdfunding literature. To the charitable giving literature, this theory
contributes to how online crowdfunding platforms interact with basic needs differently than that
of traditional charitable giving mechanisms. To the limited health care crowdfunding literature,
this is the first theory to assess whether crowdfunding is helping those with the greatest need in
the United States. The findings are consistent with the existing literature in both fields.
This thesis proceeds as follows. I begin with a background section on crowdfunding as a
growing alternative in financing personal health care. I then provide an explanation of the
historical events that led American’s health care system to rely heavily on the private market
financing. I proceed to identify the three market frictions that prevent the private health
insurance market from covering the health needs of all Americans. Next, I identify the two
segments that are in the greatest need for alternative financing for health care: low-income
individuals in non-Medicaid expansion states and individuals with chronic diseases. These two
groups make up the demand-side of the health care crowdfunding market. Then, I outline the
empirical literature on charitable giving and what it says about why people give to these causes.
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Aggregating the findings on both demand- and supply-sides of the market, I arrive at two
hypotheses. First, non-Medicaid expansion states will raise less money than Medicaid-expansion
states. Second, chronic diseases will raise more money than acute diseases. Afterwards, I discuss
my research methodology, which is based on an original dataset that I collected from
GoFundMe. I collect a representative dataset by pooling campaigns from the curated page and
keyword searches. I gather data on each campaign’s location, amount raised, target amount, and
number of donors, shares, followers, and donations. Using statistical analysis, I show that there is
supporting data for my first hypothesis. There is no supporting data for my second hypothesis.
These empirical findings prompt me to conclude with a discussion of the results, their
implications for the existing literature, and offer an alternative explanation. My results suggest
that health care crowdfunding does not help those with the greatest health care needs. Thus, I
conclude by encouraging policymakers to intervene and repair the frictions of the health market.
II. Crowdfunding is a growing alternative in financing personal health care.
In this section, I define health care crowdfunding, outline its relevant stakeholders, and
conduct a market analysis highlighting the rapid growth of this activity. I proceed to highlight
two overarching themes that are fundamental to the health care crowdfunding narrative. First,
health care is a basic right. I explain this through the citation of the United Nations’ treaties and
domestic public polls that find majority agreement that the government is responsible for
ensuring access to health care coverage. Second, health care is unaffordable, because health care
costs are rising, and left to their own devices, people are underinsured by the insurance plans
they are subscribed to.

Yang 7
Health care crowdfunding occurs when people seek donations through online
crowdfunding platforms to pay for their health care costs. Beneficiaries and donors make up the
people participating in this crowdfunding transaction.
Beneficiaries are people seeking donations, and they can be categorized as direct and
indirect beneficiaries. Direct beneficiaries are the underinsured sick patient in need of financial
aid to afford their health care. Indirect beneficiaries are the friends, relatives, and organizations
that make the financial request and seek donations on behalf of the direct beneficiary. The
expectation is they use the crowdfunded money to pay for the direct beneficiary’s treatment.
Donors are people who donate money to fund the cause, and they can be divided into two
groups. First, donors can be people who know the direct beneficiary, and as a result, donate to
help. Examples include family members, friends, and colleagues. Second, donors can be
strangers who are asked to donate or looking for causes to donate to.
Campaigns are what get crowdfunded. Beneficiaries create campaigns to explain what
happened to the person requesting the support, specify the amount the person needs for recovery.
Campaigns can include pictures, videos, and status updates to engage potential donors. Donors
donate to campaigns to help cover any portion of the beneficiary’s requested health care cost.
For-profit platforms are where the crowdfunding – whether for health care or for other
causes – happens. Online crowdfunding platforms leverage the reach of the Internet and
connectivity of social media networks of its beneficiaries and donors to curate campaigns to a
global audience. These platforms are managed by for-profit businesses, such as GoFundMe,
Bonfire, and Indiegogo. Profit is the difference between revenue and costs. The revenues for
these businesses come from platform fees, charged to the beneficiary as a fixed percentage of the
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total amount raised. However, for personal campaigns, like those that fund individual health care
costs, GoFundMe has dropped the platform fee and now just asks for voluntary tips. Using the
same or slight deviations to this business model, 191 crowdfunding platforms have been started
in the United States, followed by 44 in the United Kingdom. The proliferation of American
businesses can be explained, in part, by growing American demand for crowdfunding for a
variety of causes, from covering health care and education expenditure to funding a start-up and
passion project. Management scholar Nir Kshetri finds that the US accounts for 72% of the 2013
global crowdfunding market.1 And this demand is growing globally as Statista values the 2018
crowdfunding market at $10.2 billion and forecasts a 2025 valuation of $28.8 billion.2
Within crowdfunding, health care crowdfunding is growing rapidly. The evolving
business of GoFundMe, the crowdfunding market leader, illustrates this trend. In 2010,
GoFundMe launches as a crowdfunding platform for project ideas and wedding gifts – not health
care. However, the company soon observes that the most funded campaigns on its platform are
those covering personal health care expenses. More specifically, between 2010 and 2018, about
one-third of all funded campaigns on its platform are health care campaigns. Annually,
GoFundMe raises over $650 million for health care campaigns.3 I also find that $115,536,240 is
raised across 5,596 GoFundMe health care campaigns in my original dataset. Thus, health care
crowdfunding has grown rapidly to become a major part of the market leader’s crowdfunding
activity. This demand is further illustrated in how GoFundMe has redesigned its platform and
identified its acquisition targets. The business now has a prominent “Medical” category that
curates its health care campaigns and claims to be the default platform for health care

1

Kshetri 2015
Szmigiera, 2019
3
Bluth, 2019
2
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crowdfunding needs. Moreover, GoFundMe has acquired YouCaring, a major competitor in
health care crowdfunding, to consolidate its dominance in the health care crowdfunding space.4
The core concept that underlies the value in online crowdfunding is that these platforms
connect a large group of donors – of friends and strangers – with campaigns that can financially
support its beneficiary. Because of the global reach of online networks, strangers from different
socioeconomic classes can be connected to support someone in desperate need for help. I see this
occur in the media. In November of 2018, 60-year old Missourian Hedda Martin is not qualified
for a necessary heart transplant. The medical committee that rejected her transplant application,
because she was underinsured and thus lacked a secure financial plan to pay for her posttransplant recovery needs. The committee urges her to launch a fundraising effort to raise
$10,000. So, Martin’s son creates a campaign on GoFundMe on her behalf. The campaign
catches media attention. Moreover, it catches the attention of Representative Alexandria OcasioCortez (AOC) in New York. AOC shares the information on her Twitter page to her 6.7 million
followers. Over forty-four thousand dollars are crowdfunded, and Martin gets her transplant.5
What is important to note in Martin’s story, which is representative of many others, are
the two prevailing themes in the staple health care crowdfunding narrative: (1) people have a
right to health care, and (2) health care is unaffordable. First, the right to health care is explained
through both international community standards and domestic public opinion. Next, health care
is unaffordable, because costs are increasing and people, left to their own devices, are
underinsured.

4
5

Lunden, 2018
Keshner, 2018
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While health care is a basic human right that has been recognized by most countries in
the United Nations, this is not the case in United States. All industrialized countries have ratified
the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 25 of the UDHR
codifies the universal right to health. Subsequently, every industrialized nation except for the
United States shifted to implementing universal health systems. While the treaty did not formally
mandate the need for universal health systems, most of the international community recognize
that to have health as a basic right meant also having access to a universal health system. An
explicit effort is then made to codify the universal right to health care in Article 12 of UN’s
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural and Rights (CESCR). Specifically, the Article
formally recognizes that “states must protect this right…through a comprehensive system of
health care, which is available to everyone without discrimination, and economically accessible
to all.”6 The treaty holds member states accountable for providing a health system that does not
discriminate against people on the basis of cost. All member states signed the CESCR, but the
United States was one of three countries that did not ratify it. But while health care is not a basic
right in the United States, health is a universal basic right. Universal basic rights are fundamental
rights that every human should have and codified by the international community. Since most of
the international community recognizes the basic human right to health care, health care is a
basic right for humans residing in the United States.
There is strong bipartisan support in the mass public that access to health care coverage is
a government responsibility. Pew Research Center finds that six-in-ten Americans continue to
believe that ensuring health care coverage is a government responsibility. Even among the 37%
who express disagreement, they still overwhelming support the continuance of government-run

6

Gerisch, 2018
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health care programs like Medicare and Medicaid.7 Thus, across partisan lines, there is an
explicit and implied public consensus that people are entitled to health care coverage. And these
opinions are operationalized in elections. According to the Gallup's October 2018 Midterm
Election Benchmark poll, 80% of polled registered voters name health care as a very important
policy topic they will consider in choosing who to vote for – placing health care above the policy
domains of economy and immigration.8 Thus, voters care about health care as a policy area that
deserves attention. Unsurprisingly, the Kaiser Family Foundations find that most Americans are
concerned about access to health care due to costs.9 To quantify this concern, the Pew Research
Center reveals that approximately 83% of Americans feel that health care costs are
problematic.10.
One reason the public think health care costs are problematic is that the costs are
expensive. The 2018 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services report shows that the national
health expenditure – how much the country spends on health care – grew by 4.6% from 2017,
thereby amounting to approximately $3.6 trillion or 17.7% of gross domestic product (GDP). Out
of pocket expenditure – how much people pay for health care using their own disposable
incomes, because the insurance doesn’t cover it – grew by 2.8% to $375.6 billion. That is, out of
pocket expenditures make up 10% of 2018’s national health expenditure.11
People when left to their own devices are likely to be underinsured, and thus not have
access to their ideal health coverage plans. In 2018, 91.5% of the population is insured.12

7

Kiley, 2018
Newport, 2018
9
Kirzinger et al., 2019
10
“Most Americans Say the High Costs of Medical Treatments Are a Big Problem,” 2018
11
“NHE Fact Sheet,” 2020
12
Berchick, 2019, p. 1
8
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However, a survey on economic wellbeing by the Federal Reserve finds that 20% of adults had
major, unexpected medical bills to pay in 2018. So, while most of the population is insured, onefifth of Americans are still facing unexpected medical expenses that were not covered by their
insurance. Among this group, 40% had unpaid debt from those bills. The median range for these
bills is between $1,000 and $4,999.13 Thus, the data suggest that Americans are underinsured,
meaning that they purchased health insurance plans that fall short of meeting their actual health
care needs.
III. Historical events have led the United States to rely more on private health insurance.
In this section, I explain the historical events that led the United States to rely more on
private health insurance rather than government-provided insurance. While many winning
presidential campaigned on expanding health care, their efforts – aside from that of Presidents
Johnson and Obama – ultimately were not enacted due to shifting political priorities and interest
group opposition. Over time, various legislations caused for-profit insurance firms to replace
non-profits as the primary provider of insurance. The culmination of these events led up to the
modern American reliance on private health insurance markets.
Early twentieth-century advances in medicine increased demand for health care services.
In his observations of the hospital setting, Dr. Benjamin Rush wrote: “Hospitals are the sinks of
human life.”14 This description characterized what hospitals, as institutions of advanced
medicine, were like before the early 20th century. Hospitals were funded by charity and provided
health care to the poor. Hospitals were unsanitary and unsafe. The medical technology was
rudimentary. Rather than working at hospitals to profit and practice advance medicine,

“Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S Households in 2018 – May 2019,” 2019
“THE RESULT OF OBSERVATIONS MADE UPON THE DISEASES WHICH OCCURRED IN THE Military
Hospitals of the United States, DURING THE LATE WAR,” 1793, p. 184
13
14
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physicians often volunteered at hospitals to train and gain clinical experience. They then
leveraged their clinical experience to offer for-profit services to middle- and uppersocioeconomic class patients. But even then, the value of medical treatments was limited. This
changed following a series of inventions from anesthesia and X-rays to cleanliness practices. As
a result, medicine in hospitals became more effective and safer. Doctors were able to use
anesthesia to reduce pain during surgeries. X-rays improved the accuracy of diagnosis.
Cleanliness practices reduced the spread of infectious diseases, thereby improving the overall
quality of hospital care. These improvements generated greater and broader demand.
Increased demand brought health care into the political spotlight, where candidates and
organizations called for its provision through some degree of government involvement. Thenpresidential candidate Theodore Roosevelt, running on a progressive platform, campaigned for
universal health coverage in 1914. This was the first time a major presidential candidate put
healthcare as a campaign issue on a national platform. Other non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) also tried to provide their members with health care access by working with
government. For example, the American Association for Labor tried to develop health insurance
programs with the help of state governments and labor unions.15 Thus, in the early stages of
modern American health care, the public interest in having the government operationally
involved with health care provision existed.
However, World War I shifted the nation’s priorities away from health care reform, thus
leaving opportunities for NGOs to satisfy unmet demand without government involvement. The
government started to focus on preparing for war. Labor unions took this opportunity to

15

Manchikanti et al., 2017, p. 108
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prioritize recruitment and expansion. Health care was relegated to the sidelines, and existing
efforts were halted. As a result, both Roosevelt and American Association for Labor’s healthcare
efforts with federal and state governments, respectively, fell short.16 Nonetheless, the demand
remained unfulfilled. Government was preoccupied with other priorities. Thus, NGOs had the
opportunity to meet an existing demand without government involvement.
Nonprofit hospitals became the best candidates to fulfill the unmet public demand, and
they began the early development of the American health insurance market. Because nonprofit
hospitals already had the medical infrastructure, they were best positioned to use their existing
resources to meet the public demand. In 1929, while trying to make health care more accessible
to his local community, Baylor University’s executive vice-president Justin Ford Kimball
proposed a plan: Ask Dallas schoolteachers to pay six dollars a year to Baylor’s nonprofit
university teaching hospital for 21 days of hospitalization coverage per year. The proposal
effectively attracted local teachers, and the successful execution of this flat-rate prepaid model at
Baylor prompted other nonprofit hospitals to learn and adopt.17 These payment plans were the
early versions of health insurance plans. And while the proliferated adoption of these prepaid
plans was rapid, the market was still in its early stages. Thus, the government could still have
intervened.
While the New Deal ushered in a mass expansion of the welfare state, health care was
largely left out because of opposition by the American Medical Association (AMA). Demand for
government provision of health care still existed. During the drafting of the Social Security Act,
groups like the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care advocated to include health insurance as

16
17

“The Role of the Federal Government in Health and Earlier Healthcare Efforts”, 2004, p. 30
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part of the bill. However, Democrat President Franklin D. Roosevelt ultimately removed health
insurance from the Social Security Act primarily due to opposition from the AMA. The AMA
opposed any type of health insurance, because it wanted to protect the power physicians had to
independently charge for their services. Pricing power was important, because many physicians
owned their practices. Each practice faced different cost structures due to different supplier
relationships and business conditions. Thus, a key power they had was the ability to set their own
prices for the value of their service. Health insurance would have removed this pricing power
from physicians and given it to an external stakeholder, such as the government or hospitals.
Thus, the AMA threatened to stop the passage of Roosevelt’s Social Security Act should the bill
include one. And because of the size and effective organization of the AMA, its threat was
credible.18 Thus, Roosevelt removed health care from the Social Security Act to ensure that the
rest of the bill passed. This political power play in the health care policy field inhibited the
expansion of government’s welfare role into health care, spurring the growth of nonprofit
hospital health insurance plans.
As nonprofit health insurance plans proliferated, the Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Associations pioneered the American health insurance marketplace. Two nonprofit associations,
offering similar payment plans to the public, were founded around 1939: The Blue Cross
Association and the Blue Shield Association. The Blue Cross Association was an association of
nonprofit hospitals that were adopting payment plans like that of Baylor University’s. The Blue
Cross plans were offered by hospitals to their community members who paid an annual fee – or
premium – to access hospital care throughout the year. The plans increased demand for hospital
services. This increase was concerning to physicians who feared competition from hospitals.

18
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Thus, physicians established the Blue Shield Association to adopt similar prepayment insurance
plans that covered home and office visits. The customers that subscribed to these plans also paid
a premium in exchange for physician services. Thus, the early stages of the American health
insurance market were defined by a duopoly between hospitals and physicians. These two market
leaders both adopted community ratings that aimed to maximize the number of people who could
access health care.
Community ratings ensured that these nonprofit health insurers improved the accessibility
of health care to the public’s growing demand for it. Community rating meant that premiums
charged for the same level of coverage did not vary across individual circumstances. Everyone
who paid the premium had access to the same level of coverage. Doing so, these organizations
improved the accessibility of health care, so that hospitals and physicians could meet the
growing demand for health care. Community rating improved accessibility, because it enabled
cross-subsidization of healthcare costs between the sick and healthy, the poor and rich, and the
elderly and youth. Consider the dynamics between the elderly and the youth. Assume that the
elderly is more likely to get sick, thus the elderly would be costlier to the insurer. As a result,
from a financial standpoint, the elderly should be charged more for the health insurance relative
to the youth, because the elderly is more likely to use the insurance and are thus costlier.
However, community ratings don’t consider individual health circumstances. They charged
everyone the same premium for the same amount of services covered. This helped lower health
care costs for the elderly by subsidizing the expenses of the elderly with the payments made by
the youth. This cross-subsidization made health care more accessible to the elderly and the sick.
However, to sustain this model, insurers must have a continuous inflow of the young and
healthy, and the proportion of young and healthy must exceed the elderly and sick. But the
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problem was that young and healthy people may not necessarily value insurance at the price
charged. Thus, the community rating model was vulnerable to any competition that could offer
similar insurance products at lower prices.
The community rating models failed to compete against more competitively priced plans
charged by for-profit insurers who used experience rating pricing models. The proof-of-concept
provided by nonprofit Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans prompted large industrial employers and
once hesitant for-profit commerical insurance companies to enter the health insurance
marketplace around 1941. Some large employers provided integrated healthcare systems. These
systems employed a network of health care providers and offered health insurance to members
within the company’s employee community. Kaiser Permanente, founded in 1942, was one of
them. Meanwhile, commercial insurance companies also entered the health insurance market as
for-profit businesses. They entered with existing insurance businesses that spanned both the
scope of coverage, so covering life insurance and other domains of insurance, and geography, so
providing nationwide coverage. Because of their profit maximization objectives, they wanted to
reduce costs and maximize revenues. Thus, they were incentivized to abandon community rating
used by prevailing nonprofit health insurance for experience rating. Experience rating charged
customers based on their individual risk of becoming sick. Effectively, this model enabled
insurance companies to discriminate health care access based on a customer’s riskiness and
relatedly, their ability to pay. As such, the sick and elderly would either be charged at a higher
price than the healthy young or be not eligible for insurance coverage. And the high price might
not be affordable if the sick and elderly were also poor. Thus, each customer was priced
differently for the same set of covered services in the health insurance plan they subscribed to.
This allowed companies to offer a variety of health insurance plans across a range of prices to
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target different customer segments with different levels of risk. Specifically, for the young and
healthy, for-profit insurers offered lower-cost plans with less services covered. This cheaper
option effectively deterred young and healthy customers away from Blue Cross and Blue
Shield’s community rated plans. The loss of young and healthy inflows of people into
community rated plans forced the nonprofit model that focused on maximizing health care access
to become obsolete.19
Around the same time, in 1942, the Stabilization Act increased demand for employersponsored health insurance by leaving employers to compete for workers with fringe benefits. To
stabilize inflation, Congress passed the Stabilization Act to prevent employers from competing
for employees based on wages as there was a scarcity of avaliable workers. Employers could
however compete for employees by offering more competitive fringe benefit packages that did
not exceed 5% of wages. Meanwhile, health care demand was growing, and for-profit insurers
were beginning to offer low-cost insurance plans for the healthy. Thus, employers knew that
people wanted health care, and that the cost of healthcare plans would probably be cheap, as
people who work are generally healthy. So, employers who did not want to create integrated
health systems decided to work with private insurance companies to offer employer-sponsored
health insurance plans as fringe benefits. Employees responded positively to the offering, and
this resulted in employer-sponsored health insurance becoming a critical means of how many
Americans received their health insurance. In 2018, the United States Census Bureau calculated
that approximately 55.1% of the population had employer-sponsored health insurance.20

19
20
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Then, the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945 ceded federal regulatory power over insurance
markets to states, thereby decentralizing any significant federal regulatory power over health
insurance markets. This federal law exempted private insurers from federal regulation.21 It
prevented the federal government from regulating pricing, coverage, and other features of health
insurance. As a result of the bill, each state was given authority to regulate the health insurance
market within their borders. This decentralization generated a variety of outcomes for health
insurers as states varied in their approach to regulation. Some states take advantage of their
power to force insurance companies to only operate within their borders and encouraged the
development of regional monopolies. Meanwhile other states removed all regulations on
competition and made companies compete in the free market. As a result, the private health
insurance marketplace became extremely fragmented.
Next, in 1954, the government began to indirectly subsidize the private insurance market
through tax breaks, which increased public reliance on private health insurance. In 1954, the IRS
issued tax breaks on employer contributions, which included the contributions made to
employer-sponsored healthcare plans.22 This altered incentives on wages. For every dollar an
employee earned, there was an economic incentive to invest that dollar into the employersponsored health insurance plan rather than to withdraw it as money. Thus, assuming that people
were indifferent to the benefit derived from either option, the withdrawl would be taxed while
the investment would not. As a result, employer contributions into sponsored-health insurance
plans were financially valued more in the short-term. Employees recognized this incentive and
demanded more employer-contributions into their health insurance plans. Employers spent more

21
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on employer-sponsored health insurance. American workers then became even more reliant on
private insurance. And this reliance is in part encouraged by the government’s indirect
subsidization of private health insurance markets. Economist Jonathan Gruber projected that this
tax break was worth approximately $260 billion.23
Then in 1974, the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) exempted self-insured,
multi-state employers from state regulations on health insurance, thus prompting cost-cutting
actions and underinsurance effects. ERISA was not passed with the intention to impact the
healthcare market. However, the act in practice pre-empted state regulation of self-insured,
multi-state employers. As a result, multi-state employers did not have to abide by state laws in
choosing which health insurance packages they offered their employees. This change led to the
undermining of a centralized government oversight over the health insurance market to regulate
key insurance elements such as pricing and coverage. This was even more problematic when
considering the large inconsistencies in health insurance plans left behind by the McCarranFerguson Act.24. Left to their own devices, for-profit employers, seeking to lower health care
costs, worked with for-profit insurers to commercialize health care. This unregulated cost-cutting
effort created ample opportunities to underinsure the American working class who relied on
health insurance through their employers. Effectively, employers and their insurers took this
opportunity to cover less services and a smaller proportion of health care costs. The
consequential impact on the American working class was that more people became underinsured,
and thus their out-of-pocket health care expenses increased.
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As these policies passed and the private market matured, many winning presidents
campaigned on the issue of health care, but their platforms were ultimately not enacted. President
Harry S. Truman called for a compulsory national health insurance program that would be
funded by a 1.5% payroll tax. While Truman won the election, he was not able to leverage his
public support to pass his healthcare proposal, because of active opposition from the AMA.25
Then in 1960, Democrat Senator John F. Kennedy campaigned on adding a health care
amendment to the Social Security Act. While victorious in his presidential election, President
Kennedy lacked support from Congress to pursue a major comprehensive health care reform bill.
The federal government finally made headway when President Johnson passed Medicare
and Medicaid in 1965 through a bipartisan compromise. Following President Kennedy’s
assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson passed the Medicare and Medicaid bills to create a
government-provided healthcare system for the general American public. Medicare was a twopart bill passed based on a bipartisan compromise and drew upon the legacies of the Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans. Drawing upon past Democratic proposals, Medicare Part A covered
hospital services and was financed through a payroll tax. Based on past Republican proposals,
Medicare Part B covered physician services and was financed by two revenue streams: enrollee
premiums and general government revenue. These programs significantly expanded public
access to health care. Medicaid, on the other hand, capitalized on this momentum to insure the
qualified low-income and vulnerable populations that otherwise would have been uninsured.
Medicaid was financed through public dollars and required state-buy, which it did not always
have.26
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Rather than pursue more reforms of health care and despite bipartisan interest on the
issue, subsequent administrations relegated health care to a secondary issue. Legislators from
both Republican and Democrat parties introduced several proposals between the 1970s and into
the early 1990s, proposing different versions of national health insurance programs financed by
payroll taxes, general federal revenues, and instituting individual mandates. None succeeded,
because health care was no longer viewed as a primary policy concern.27
President Clinton succeeded in reviving health care as a primary issue for the modern
century. In 1992, Bill J. Clinton campaigned on health care as a priority for his administration.
Like many of his predecessors, he failed to deliver a comprehensive healthcare reform. Despite
this policy failure, the Clinton administration’s focus on health care revived health care as a
primary policy issue for subsequent administrations to focus on.28
President Obama managed to make major headway in reforming an increasingly costly
health insurance market with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA). President Barack Obama campaigned on and then passed the ACA in 2010, advancing a
major marketplace reform on the American health insurance market. The ACA reinstituted
community ratings, banned market discrimination against enrollees with pre-existing conditions,
expanded Medicaid upon state buy-in, and closed gaps in what services were not being
sufficiently covered by Medicare. Moreover, the government mandated ten essential health
benefits that the plans on the ACA marketplace must cover, thus regaining some centralized

27
28

Manchikanti et al., 2017
Igel, 2008

Yang 23
regulatory authority. This new regulatory power was awarded to federal and state agencies to
ensure progress in advancing health care’s quality, access, and coverage.29
The subsequent challenges to the ACA showed the controversies surrounding health care
reform that delay significant changes to the health care market. In 2012, the ACA was
challenged in the Supreme Court over two of its features: the individual mandate and its promise
to withhold existing federal financial support to states that don’t expand Medicaid. The
individual mandate taxed uninsured individuals to coerce people into buying health insurance.
The latter feature was designed to coerce states into expanding Medicaid using federal dollars.
The former was ruled as constitutional on the grounds that the financial penalty was
fundamentally a tax, and Congress had taxation power. The latter failed to hold up in court,
because Congress was not authorized to force states to accept Medicaid expansion.30 The ACA
was challenged again in the courts in 2015 and 2019.31 Even in the legislative branch, in 2017, a
Republican Congress attempted but failed to pass an ACA repeal bill and an ACA-replacement
bill. The replacement bill was intended to better align with Republican values for health care
reform.32 Thus, health care reform was not only difficult to pass, but it was also difficult to keep.
The ACA was still challenged on Constitutional and ideological grounds years after its passage
in 2010. And thus, health care remained a controversial topic and efforts to reform it at the
government-level remain difficult if not unfruitful.
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IV. There are three market frictions that prevent the private health insurance market from
covering the health needs of all Americans.
In this section, I explore the three market frictions that prevent the private health
insurance market from covering the health needs of all Americans. First, existing contingent
contract markets discourage the provision of coverage for individuals, especially those who are
low-income. Second, adverse selection deters insurers from covering high-risk customers. Third,
moral hazard effects increase the aggregate cost of health care, which exacerbates the
affordability problems that then may deter even more Americans from getting insurance through
the private market.
i. Existing contingent contracts are limited and biased against individuals.
The nature of health care requires that it be insured through a market of contingent
contracts. However, large groups are necessary to reduce high administrative costs faced by
insurers. Thus, individuals that lack access to these groups tend to be excluded by the market.
The technical and uncertain nature of health care requires its insurance to be provided for
through a market of contingent contracts. When economist Kenneth J. Arrow in 1963 discusses
contingent contracts, he argues that an optimal market for contingent contracts must exist,
because health care requires complex technical knowledge to understand. And even with mastery
of the technical knowledge, health care is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Thus,
Arrow says that contingent contracts are necessary to meet customer demand for health care.
These contracts take effect when certain conditions specified in the contract are met. The
contingent contract market should ideally allow customers to choose from any combination of
prespecified services, prices, and providers.33
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However, insurers are incentivized to capitalize on economies of scale to reduce
significant administrative costs associated with health insurance provision. The ideal market
effectively requires an individualized approach, which is administratively difficult and costly to
operate on. Health economist Michael Chernew notes that writing, coordinating, verifying and
operating individualized contingent contracts would require an abundance of work and incur
high administrative costs.34 As such, Arrow emphasizes that insurers are incentivized to exploit
administrative costs by spreading the costs across large groups.35 Hence, insurers were
incentivized to meet demand for employer-sponsored insurance plans in the 1940s when
employers began offering healthcare benefits to their employees. With the employer’s input,
prespecified health insurance plans were offered to a large group of employees. These insured
employees are generally homogenous. Since they are working, they are most likely healthy. As a
result, insurers can generally expect these people to be less costly. Consequently, theses costsavings are passed on to employers who pass it down to their employees. This process generates
a general alignment of interests that incentivize insurers to cover groups.
Thus, individuals tend to be left out of the health insurance market. Health economist
Sherry Glied notes that Arrow’s research implies that people who do not have direct access to
employer-sponsored health insurance also lack individual coverage.36 The United States Census
Bureau finds supporting evidence for this implication; the average uninsured American is
expected to be a low-income, working male without a high school diploma and between the ages
of 19-64.37 Underlying both the theory and uninsured profile is an acknowledgement that not all
employers provide health insurance to their employees. Thus, for those employees, they are left
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to their own devices. If limited to the private market, then these individuals are likely to lack
individual coverage. Leveraging the profile of the average uninsured American worker, these
individuals tend to be low-income. While insurers do offer health insurance plans for individuals
on the marketplace, the cost of individual plans may be prohibitively unaffordable. Thus, the
health needs of individuals – especially low-income individuals – who cannot pay for the plans
on the marketplace tend not be met by the private health insurance market. However, even with
the avaliable contingent contracts offered by the private market, adverse selection adds another
friction in limiting who gets served by the private market.
ii. Adverse selection deters high-risk individuals from getting private health insurance.
High-risk customers often rely more on higher-priced, but more generous health
insurance plans. Thus, they are more likely to opt-in to and adversely select costlier health
insurance plans. However, because they are costly to insurers, insurers are incentivized to
uninsured or not insurance them at all.
Choice in private health insurance markets allow for adverse selection. Adverse selection
occurs when sick people choose generous insurance plans. In private health insurance markets,
customers can choose which plans they purchase based on their health needs and willingness to
pay. The coverage provided by different plans differ in what services are covered and how much
these services are covered by. For example, a low-cost plan may cover dental and vision services
but only cover those services up to 10% of their retail price. Alternatively, a generous, moreexpensive plan may cover a breadth of services and 100% of the cost for those service. As such,
people who are either sick or at a high-risk of becoming sick are more likely to need more health
services. So relative to healthy people, they are more likely to buy a more generous health
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insurance plan.38 This adverse selection results in the separation of sick or high-risk customers
from healthy or low-risk customers. The overconcentration of high-risk customers in already
costly plans leads insurers to charge disproportionately higher prices for the plans.
Insurers are also incentivized to reduce the cost of high-risk customers and thus deter
them from enrolling into these generous plans. To control the quality of customers within their
plans, insurers engage in the process called risk selection. Within employer-sponsored health
insurance, insurers could institute onerous processes for referrals to specialty services or require
users to make a large portion of their health care costs out-of-pocket. These mechanisms
effectively discourage high-risk customers from purchasing generous insurance packages.39
As such, the deterrence measures instituted by private insurers constrain the extent to
which the private health insurance market can meet the needs for high-risk customers. Those
who do purchase a plan may end up underinsured, because the coverage is inadequate. Other
high-risk people may be discouraged to purchase and become uninsured.40 Either way, the
outcomes are suboptimal, such that the private health insurance markets fall short in meeting the
health needs of high-risk people.
iii. Moral hazard increases the cost burden for all Americans, thus limiting the reach of
private markets to serving only those who can afford it.
Even for those who purchase private market health insurance plans, the friction of moral
hazard leads to an aggregate increase in prices for health care. Much of the literature on
insurance markets is devoted to moral hazard. In health insurance, moral hazard occurs when the
insured begin engaging in risky health behaviors, after they purchase health insurance. This
increased usage increases aggregate health care costs. Arrow observes that widespread health
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insurance increases demand for health care.41 Glied further expands that the expanded scope of
services covered by health insurance has increased health expenditure, because of moral hazard
effects.42 The people buying insurance are using more health care services, which are covered by
their insurance. Increased demand prompts doctors and hospitals to charge higher prices since
the supply of health care is not growing as quickly. As medical technologies improve, the health
care quality increases, which further contribute to price increases.43 These increases are paid for
by insurers. To avoid bankruptcy, insurers then increase their prices to offset growing health care
expenses. In aggregate, health expenditure increases.
Insurers have implemented mechanisms to reduce the moral hazard effects, but average
consumers are not aware of those mechanisms at the time of purchase. Insurers are increasing the
amount customers pay before the insurance takes effect. However, average Americans may not
be aware of these features at the time of purchase. A group of health economists find that only
14% of a nationally representative sample could correctly answer four multiple choice questions
that tested the basic features of health insurance plans.44 Moreover, insurers have also added
supply-side cost-sharing measures that limit the excessive use of health care by providers. The
measures include utilization monitoring to deter physicians from oversupplying health services.45
However, moral hazard effects persist in the private market, increasing health
expenditure and thereby risk leaving behind people overwhelmed by its costs. Glied concludes
that issues of moral hazard persist in the health insurance market today. Furthermore, the
advances in medical technology have increased both the quality and cost of health care. Faced
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with prohibitively expensive costs, more Americans are either opting into cheaper plans that
leave them underinsured or out of the private market. Thus, the heightened cost of health care
exacerbates the market’s failure in extending health coverage to more Americans.46
V. Low-income and high-risk Americans will have the greatest need for additional support
for health care expenses outside of the private insurance market.
In this section, I explain that low-income and high-risk Americans will have the greatest
need for alternative financing mechanisms like crowdfunding. Namely, I first explain how
existing contingent contract effects and the incomplete expansion of Medicaid under the ACA
leave a significant portion of low-income individuals uninsured. Without support from the
private insurance market and being ineligible for public coverage, these individuals have a great
need for an alternative means to affording health care. Second, I explain how the costliness of
high-risk, primarily chronically ill individuals, leave many of these individuals sick and
uninsured or underinsured. As a result, they will also be in great need for additional support.
i. Among those impaired by income, low-income Americans in non-ACA Medicaid
expansion states are in greatest need for additional support.
Income remains a barrier in access to the private health insurance market, because of
existing contingent contracts and moral hazard effects. Existing contingent contracts often create
significant price disparities between employer-sponsored health insurance plans and individual
plans. Namely, because individual plans cannot capitalize on the economies of scale that
employer-sponsored plans can, individual plans on the private markets are expensive. Their costs
are further exacerbated as a result of the cost increases through moral hazard effects. Moral
hazard incentivizes the insured to overutilize the health care system, thereby increasing health
expenditure.
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Confronting high health care costs, low-income workers are most vulnerable to being
uninsured by the private market. Low-income workers often either lack access to job-based
coverage or the disposable income needed to pay for employer-sponsored insurance plans. Thus,
within the private market, they are left to individual insurance plans, of which the majority often
cannot afford. In 2018, the United States Census Bureau estimates that only 24.7% of lowincome people, categorized by those who make below 138% of the federal poverty line, had
private insurance. This percent is almost triple that of the national average of 67.3%.47 Thus,
low-income individuals have difficulty seeking coverage through the private insurance market.48
As a result, low income workers can either attempt to get health insurance through the public
market or be uninsured.
However, the public market is limited in its coverage for low-income workers, because of
means-tested features associated with traditional Medicaid and lack of state opt-in to ACA
Medicaid expansion. Traditional Medicaid, passed by President Johnson’s administration in
1965, has stringent eligibility requirements for adults. In most states, regardless of income, adults
without dependent children are not eligible for Medicaid, unless they were disabled or
pregnant.49 Thus, up until the passage of the ACA, most low-income, working class Americans –
especially males – did not have access to Medicaid. The ACA allows states to opt-in to an
expanded Medicaid program that makes all adults who make below 138% of the federal poverty
line eligible for Medicaid. Such an expansion significantly expands the public market coverage
for low-income individuals. However, states must opt-in to this expansion, and not all states
have. In 2020, 15 states have not implemented Medicaid expansion.50 Thus, while the remaining
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states have now expanded Medicaid to cover low-income adults, 15 states are still withholding
public market coverage from them. Consequently, this lack of Medicaid-expansion leaves lowincome workers in those states uninsured.
As a result, low-income workers in non-Medicaid expansion states have one of the
greatest needs for additional health financing mechanisms. In 2018, the uninsured rate for adults
who make below 100% of the federal poverty line in non-expansion states is 35.6%. This rate for
Medicaid expansion states is 16.9%, which is merits to almost a 50% reduction.51 Meanwhile,
the lack of insurance has adverse impacts on the uninsured population. The Kaiser Family
Foundation finds that the uninsured are less likely to receive preventative care, and services for
major health problems and chronic care.52 As a result of neglecting care, they end up suffering
from major health consequences, that are even more costly to treat. Thus, low-income workers in
non-expansion states demonstrate great need for alternative healthcare financing.
ii. Among those impaired by the cost burden of their health needs, high-risk chronically ill
Americans are in the greatest need for additional support.
Additionally, high-risk Americans also have a greater demand for alternative financing
because of adverse selection effects. Adverse selection can result in the segregation of customers
by their likelihood of getting sick. Thus, customers who are more likely to get sick will be more
likely to opt into more generous health insurance plans. However, the coverage of these plans
cost more, and because sick people are more likely to use the services, these plans are also
costlier to manage. Moreover, insurers are incentivized to reduce costs and thus add insurance
features that deter high-risk individuals from the private insurance market.
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A prominent group of high-risk Americans are those with chronic diseases, because they
are highly prevalent, deadly, and expensive. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) defines chronic diseases as health conditions that last over a year. These patients may also
require ongoing medical attention or be functionally impaired from day-to-day activities. Sixty
percent of American adults have a chronic disease and 40% have two or more. Thus, chronic
diseases are highly prevalent within the American population. Moreover, these diseases are
deadly. Chronic diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and diabetes are the leading causes of
death in the United States. And given the diseases’ prevalence and severity, measures to contain
them also contribute heavily to the nation’s growing annual health expenditure.53
Because chronic diseases are costly, the private insurance market is incentivized to
reduce costs by deterring customers with chronic diseases from buying insurance. Some
deterrence mechanisms are increasing premiums, deductibles, or copayments. Premiums are the
monthly or annual rates customers pay upfront to purchase health insurance. Deductibles define a
minimum cost of care that individuals need to exceed before they can access their insurance
benefits. Copayments are fixed amounts individuals pay to the medical service provider before
accessing health care. These mechanisms effectively increase the cost of health care upfront for
the individual. Thereby, they discourage patients with chronic diseases from engaging in the
private insurance market.54 Patients either exit and become uninsured by the private market or
opt-in to a suboptimal insurance plan.
Chronic diseases adversely impact a significant portion of the uninsured. Analyzing
longitudinal data from the National Health and Nutritional Examination Survey, Dr. Andrew P.
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Wilper estimates that approximately one-third of the uninsured population have chronic
diseases.55 In other words, a significant portion of the uninsured are at a high-risk of becoming
fatally sick. Thus, the demand for health care services to manage or prevent the onset of their
chronic diseases exists. However, because these patients are uninsured, they are less likely to
access the recommended care necessary to manage the disease.
Even for insured individuals with chronic diseases, they are likely to defer from seeking
necessary health care because of underinsurance. This issue is particularly relevant among
insured cancer patients. Over one-third of insured cancer treatments face higher than expected
out-of-pocket costs for their anticancer therapy. Among this group, the underinsured are most
impacted, because they are charged almost one-third of their income.56 Thus, underinsurance
leads to higher than expected health care costs for insured patients who need health care. As a
result of underinsurance, and its subsequent costs, uninsured people are also less likely to get the
care necessary to manage their disease. A large body of underinsurance literature concludes that
the underinsured are less likely to get the care they need. For example, a Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) study on underinsurance among adults with hypertension, a major
risk factor for heart disease, finds that 26% of adults with hypertension are underinsured.
Compared to their adequately insured counterparts, underinsured adults fail to receive the
recommended health care needed.57 As a result, their conditions progress unmanaged.
However, the unmanaged progression of the chronic disease inevitably leaves these
individuals with prohibitive health expenditures that require alternative financing channels to pay
off. Because uninsured and underinsured individuals are deterred from accessing the necessary
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health care to treat their disease, the disease naturally progresses. The unmanaged progression of
the disease ultimately impairs these individuals to seek emergency health care. As a result, these
individuals are most likely to consider the emergency department as their primary care site – as a
last resort. However, emergency health care is expensive. Because the patient is inadequately
covered by insurance, the charges that result from emergency health care are often
unaffordable.58 Thus, these individuals will be in great need for alternative outlets – like
crowdfunding – to raise money to pay off their medical expenses.
VI. Charitable giving literature explains the supply of crowdfunds.
In this section, I explore the literature on charitable giving and health care crowdfunding
to identify why people give to health care crowdfunding campaigns, which make up the supply
for crowd-sourced funding. Americans, relative to their OECD neighbors, rely heavily on
charitable giving to provide for basic goods, like health care. This phenomenon can be in part
explained by the prevailing view of encouraging private provision through charity. More
precisely, this phenomenon can be explained at the individual level through eight reasons that
motivate giving to health care crowdfunding campaigns.
Charitable giving plays a larger role in meeting social needs in the United States than in
other OECD countries. Public policy economist Charles T. Clotfelter observes that Americans
have consistently given approximately 2% of their income to nonprofit organizations. And this
private provision, or charity, has been primarily responsible for the country’s provision for social
needs. American charitable giving is significantly higher than that of its OECD neighbors.
Private provision of social needs in the United States makes up 10.5% of its GDP, while private
provision of social needs averaged across all OECD countries makes up 2.5% of their GDP. The
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role of charity is so significant that despite comparatively low government social expenditure,
the United States ranks second in aggregate social expenditure. Individual charitable giving
overwhelmingly makes up for what the government does not spend. Clotfelter concludes that this
trend is persistent. Furthermore, the persistence of this trend makes Americans, relative to their
OECD neighbors, rely more on private provision to address unmet social needs rather than
government.59
Given the significant role charity plays in the social landscape, the topic of how the
government should manage charity has been deeply debated among policymakers and political
philosophers. They organize their views into three schools of thought.
One school argues that the government should constrain charity but recognizes that
charity’s role in society cannot be reduced. This school is built on the theories by philosophers
Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. They fundamentally argue that government has
been entrusted with the authority to represent the interests of the common people. Charity,
provided by individuals to advance their own interests, can undermine the interests of the
common people. Thus, government has the authority to constrain charity. However, this school
also acknowledges that charity plays a significant role in American society that charity cannot be
removed. And thus, they acknowledge that they cannot prevent charity and are limited in how
much they can constrain charity.60 As such, the subsequent two schools are more prevalent in
shaping America’s charity landscape.
Another school argues that the government should protect charity, acknowledging
people’s interest in providing for the general welfare. This school is built on the theories of
philosopher John Locke, who argues that charity is a property right that citizens are legally
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entitled to. Assuming that people are social beings, Locke believes that people are interested in
and have the rights to protect their individual interests and mankind’s interests. Mankind’s
interests are those that help sustain and improve society. 61 As such, these interests include
providing for basic needs and access to basic rights. Thus, people have the right to provide,
through charity, for the basic needs of society to whatever extent possible without infringing
upon the rights of others.
The third and prevailing school argues that the government should encourage charity,
because it allows the United States to be a successful pluralist democracy. This school is built on
the theories of philosophers Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville. Burke observes that
within civil society, small communities form, because of shared interests. These interests can
include charitable giving and private provision for basic needs. These small communities
strengthen their members’ ties to the larger civil society. Tocqueville extends this argument by
attributing the success of the American polity to the formation of charity-supported associations.
More specifically, charity helps sustain minority communities and opinions. Their existence
enables a robust pluralist American democracy. 62 Thus, members in this school acknowledge
that charity helps advance individual or small-group interests that deviate from the interests of
the general public. However, Tocqueville credits this plurality of interests as key to the success
of American democracy. And Tocqueville’s view is the most referenced in charitable giving
literature.
Charitable giving literature studies motivations for why people give to charity and its
subsequent implications. Sociologists René Bekkers and Pamala Wiepking analyze the recent
literature to summarize eight factors that motivate charitable giving: awareness of need;
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solicitation; costs; reputation; value-alignment, efficacy; altruism; and warm-glow effects.63 The
first four will explain why people donate to a variety of causes on crowdfunding platforms.
Then, the next four will explain why people donate to health care campaigns.
i. People donate on crowdfunding platforms, because these platforms raise awareness of
need, solicit donors to donate, lower donation costs, and generate reputation boosts.
First, people donate, because they subjectively perceive and understand what is needed.
This need can be material, psychological, or social. Awareness can be raised through media
exposure. Communications scholar Adam F. Simon finds that media coverage on the need
directly correlates with how many donations the need gets.64 But while what the need is and how
it raises awareness is important, the donor’s subjective perception of the need is most important.
Social psychologists Carl Wagner and Ladd Wheeler find that subjective perceptions of need are
directly correlated to if they donate and the amount they donate.65
Subjective perceptions of need can be influenced by the similar-to-me bias, which then
motivate donors to give to people who are like them. The similar-to me bias occurs when people
favor others who are similar to them. Psychologists Deborah Small and Uri Simonsohn find that
donors are more likely to donate if the person asking for the donation is similar to the donor –
even if the donor has not been directly exposed to the person asking.66 Sociologist René Bekkers
observes a similar effect in which donors who have relatives dealing with similar illnesses are
more likely to donate to others who are also fighting those illnesses.67 By finding similarities
with the beneficiary, donors are then more likely to perceive the beneficiary’s need as a
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significant need. As such, this line of findings suggests that donors are likely to donate to those
who the donor can relate with.
Thus, the first reason people donate to crowdfunding platforms is that the platform raises
awareness on people’s needs and allows for donors to find needs they can relate to.
Crowdfunding platforms curate a wide variety potential needs from education and health care to
passion projects and movie equipment. Communications scholar Elizabeth Crisp Crawford
echoes this need among donors to find a more localized, comprehensively engaging, and
personalized approach to charity.68 Moreover, all campaigns can be searched for through
keywords and evaluated based on their content. The keyword searches allow donors to find
campaigns for causes donors care about. The content on campaigns allows donors to find
similarities with the beneficiary that then motivate the act of donating. Stories enable this
opportunity for donors to become more aware and help people like themselves. Thus, storytelling
becomes key in motivating donors to donate. Communications scholar, Amy Gonzales, observes
that donors are more likely to donate to campaigns that told more personal stories that better
connected with donors.69 As such, because of these design features, crowdfunding helps donors
become more aware of needs and find needs that they can relate to.
Second, people donate if solicited to donate. According to the 2001 Independent Sector
survey on Giving and Volunteering, about 57.7% of donors donated after being asked to.70 Social
psychologist Svenn Lindskold observes that reaching out and asking potential donors to donate
increases the likelihood that people donate.71 This effect remains meaningful in social media.
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Solicitations on social media networks are also effective in increasing donation behavior.
Communication scholars Jingyuan Shi and Charles T. Salmon observe that local opinion leaders
can significantly influence their followers and members within their social networks to donate by
retweeting.72 Thus, retweeting and other methods sharing people’s solicitations on social media
networks can also impact donation behavior.
As such, the second reason people donate to crowdfunding platforms is that people can
be solicited through social media to donate. Every crowdfunding campaign page gives viewers
the option to share the campaigns onto their social media channels. Thereby, the beneficiary and
those supporting the beneficiary can solicit their social media networks to donate.
Communications scholar Elizabeth Crisp Crawford highlights that crowdfunding platforms have
gained popular adoption by enabling peer-to-peer advocacy.73 The shareability of campaigns on
crowdfunding platforms to online social networks help scale and ease the solicitation process,
which then drives donations.
Third, people donate if costs are low. Costs of donating can range from the donation
amount asked for to the platform fees of processing the donation. If the requested donation
amount is high, then the amount becomes costly to the donor. As a result, the donor will be
discouraged people from donating. Thus, lowering donation costs can increase the likelihood of
donations. In their field experiment, economists Catherine C. Eckel and Philip J. Grossman find
that lowering costs of making donations increases the likelihood people donate.74
By lowering donation costs, crowdfunding encourages donation behavior. Crowdfunding
varies from traditional donation channels in that people have a lot of flexibility in deciding how
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much they will donate. Moreover, platform fees are either accounted for in the aggregate amount
the beneficiary requests or not charged for personal crowdfunding campaigns. As a result, by
extending the logic that donors donate if costs are low, and crowdfunding lowers costs, then
donors are encouraged to donate through crowdfunding.
Fourth, people donate if donating improves their reputation. Researchers René Bekkers
and Theo Schuyt observe that donations are strongly associated with measures of social
pressure.75 A measure of social pressure is reputation among peers. Pscyhologist J. T.
Muehleman finds that people donate to causes that are perceived to be good by their peers.
Doing so helps their peers see the donor in a positive light, which then helps improve the donor’s
reputation among their peers.76 Thus, people donate to improve their reputation. Furthering the
research, psychologists Phillip Brickman and James Bryan observe that people are more likely to
donate if they perceive the donation as a means of reducing inequality. Donating to an
inequality-reducing is perceived as a positive activity.77
To reap the reputation rewards, donors prefer to make their donations public, which can
be easily done through crowdfunding platforms. Charitable giving economists James Andreoni
and Ragan Petrie observe that people prefer to publicize their donations, so that their peers are
aware of their donation.78 Only when their peers become aware of their donation can they enjoy
the reputation boosting rewards that result from making the donation. As such, donors are
attracted to charitable giving channels that allow them to publicize their donation. Crowdfunding
platforms fill this need for donors by allowing donors to not only publicize their donation, but
also share with their social networks the campaigns they donated to.

75

Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008
Muehleman et al., 1976
77
Brickman and Bryan, 1975
78
Andreoni and Petrie, 2004
76

Yang 41
Moreover, by publicizing their claim to their donation, crowdfunding platforms also
encourage higher donation amounts. Economist Sarah Smith organizes online crowdfunding
donations into three categories: shining knights, widows’ mites, and the herd. Shining knights are
large donations that signal wealth, generosity, or the intimacy of the relationship between the
donor and beneficiary. Widows’ mites are small donations made primarily to avoid social stigma
for not participating. The herd are the modal donations who give what others give. What is
observed for the average donor is that they donate based on what they think they are expected to
give. That subjective evaluation considers what their peers have publicly donated. The publicly
avaliable data of past donations thus anchors how the average herd donor evaluates how much
they should donate.
Thus, crowdfunding platforms attract donors because they raise awareness, facilitate
solicitations on social media channels, lower donation costs, and publicize donations to enhance
donor reputations. From the variety of causes captured donors can donate to, people donate to
healthcare, because of these four intrinsic factors: value-alignment, efficacy; altruism; and warmglow effects.
ii. People donate to health care campaigns, because of value-alignment, efficacy, altruism,
and warm-glow effects.
First, people donate because of value alignment. People who value the common good,
social justice, and the health of the overall society are more likely to donate to causes that lead to
their better world. Bekkers and Wiepking find that donors’ value systems inform donors of what
their ideal world looks like. Motivated to make the world better, donors then donate to causes
that bring them closer to their ideal world.79 Therefore, people who want a world where there is
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universal access to health care are more likely to donate to individuals asking for donations to
fund their health care needs.
In healthcare, this value alignment happens quite frequently, because humans are
psychologically predisposed to value health care. Despite the politics on how to reform health
care, health care is a valence issue that cuts across partisan lines. Human evolution historians
Carsten Jensen and Michael Bang Petersen attribute its valence to people’s instinct to care about
health care. Humans are naturally been predisposed to concerning themselves with the random
nature of sickness and the need for help when they are sick. These two factors are essential to
survival but are often out of human control. As a result, these two factors have evolved into
deep-seated psychological constraints that naturally bias people to perceive the sick as deserving
of support.80 Thus, people will be motivated to give because of this psychologically ingrained
valuation for people’s health.
Second, people give for efficacy. These donors want their donation to maximize its
impact. Bekkers and Wiepking observe that donations and perceived efficacy of that donation are
directly related.81 Extending similar findings, economist Brian Duncan proposes a theory for
charitable giving to capture this desire to donate to make a perceived difference: impact
philanthropy. Impact philanthropy suggests that people donate to causes in which they can
personally make a difference.82
Thus, donors donate to health care crowdfunding, because providing for one’s health care
comes with other benefits. Aside from the positive media stories of individuals securing health
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care through crowdfunding, donors can also reference the positive externalities that they help
generate by crowdfunding an individual’s health care. Between 2006 and 2011, crowdfunding
scholars Gordon Burtch and Jason Chan find that health care campaigns reduced about 3.9
percent of all medical related bankruptcies in the United States.83 Thus, donors who donate to
health care crowdfunding can help reduce the individual’s bankruptcy risk, which can allow the
patient to not have to sell their house to pay off their health care expenses. If the patient recovers,
then the donation will help extend the patient’s lifetime with the patient’s friends and family.
Third, on a similar vein, people donate because of altruism. The difference among valuealigned, efficacy, and altruistic donors is their goals. Value-aligned donors care about advancing
their greater society. Efficacy-motivated donors care about maximizing their individual impact.
Meanwhile, altruistic donors care about just helping the beneficiary to whatever capacity the
donor can. The donor’s welfare is therefore a function of how much of the basic good is provided
rather than by how it is funded. A large body of literature captures this motivation through the
public goods theory of philanthropy. A key premise to this theory is that the cause that people
crowdfund is considered a public good, because this cause is a factor in most of the public’s
individual utility functions. If it wasn’t, then people wouldn’t donate. Often, this utility comes
from the cause’s altruistic externalities, of which better health care has many of.84 For example, a
donor donating to another person’s health care treatment derives utility from knowing that they
have helped improve that person’s welfare. Thus, altruism can motivate giving behavior to health
care campaigns.
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However, altruistic giving to health care can lead to crowding out of public provision for
health care. A major concern within the altruistic giving literature is that there is a dollar-fordollar indirect relationship between private and public provision for basic goods. The increase in
one will crowd out funds provided by the other. Economist Robert Sugden observes that this
crowding out effect exists but does not persist.85 Health care crowdfunding literature also
observes the crowding out effect but is inconclusive on its persistence. Political sociologist
Martin Lukk finds that Canadian health care crowdfunding is growing as government health
expenditure is decreasing.86 Across countries, Dr. Gaia Bassani finds data suggesting a
substitution effect between health care crowdfunding and public health insurance.87 While these
early studies suggest a potential crowding out effect, the research is limited and inconclusive on
how persistent this effect is.
As an alternative explanation for the lack of a persistent crowding out effect from pure
altruism, the fourth reason people donate is to enjoy the warm glow effect. Thus, people give not
necessarily because of the altruistic interests in helping others but rather because of the warm
glow the donor feels by doing good. This warm glow is captured by the impure altruism theory.
The theory provides an alternative explanation to the crowding out concern by pure altruist
scholars. Andreoni builds the impure altruism theory to predict that in a world where there are
only two payers for basic needs – government and private individual donors – government funds
will incompletely crowd out private donations. Because individual donors feel a warm glow from
donating, they do not see their donations as perfect substitutes for government contributions.88
As such, they will still donate regardless of the extent of public provision, because the donation
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makes them feel good. Economists Heidi Crumpler and Philip J. Grossman find that this warm
glow exists and plays a significant role in explaining giving behavior.89 Economist William
Harbaugh supports their findings with his neuropsychological analysis, which shows that
donating elicits neural activity in areas associated with reward processing.90
However, because people donate for the warm glow effect, they may be less likely to
optimize the welfare impact of their donations. Global Health researcher Clair Null observes that
most donors exhibit socially inefficient giving behavior. That is, they continue to give to
campaigns they like, even when those campaigns have exceeded their goals and other
comparable campaigns are underfunded. She explains part of this inefficient behavior by finding
that few donors care about information gathering, which would have allowed them to evaluate
and maximize the welfare impact of their donations.91 Thus, these findings are consistent with
the charitable giving literature that suggests that warm-glow givers are less likely to care about
the welfare implications of their donations. As a result, some campaigns may be overfunded, and
others may be underfunded.
Thus, people donate to health care crowdfunding campaigns. People donate to health care
campaigns because of values-alignment, efficacy in maximizing individual impact, altruism, and
warm-glow effects. Donors give through crowdfunding platforms, because the platforms raise
awareness, facilitate solicitations on social media channels, lower donation costs, and publicize
donations to enhance donor reputations. These findings provide insight on what types of
campaigns are likely to get funded.
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The four intrinsic factors motivate giving to the underserved segments of the health
insurance market. These segments have the greatest demand and are prevalent in society. There
are two segments: the uninsured for being low-income in non-Medicaid expansion states and
those without adequate insurance for having chronic conditions. Value-aligned donors will
donate to correct a society inadequacy. Efficacy-donors will donate, because donating to causes
with the greatest demands can maximize the donor’s impact. Altruists will donate to these
segments, because they need help. Impure altruists will donate to get warm glow from doing
good. Thus, these two segments appropriately fit the four intrinsic factors.
However, income changes the dynamic of where crowdfunding dollars are likely to go.
People donate on crowdfunding platforms, because of awareness, solicitation, cost, and
reputation. A caveat to this literature though is that not everyone has the resources to donate,
even if the desire to exists. Generally, those who donate have disposable income, and are
typically not low-income. Moreover, donors are subjective rather than objective in evaluating
need. Consequently, they will likely fall victim to similar-to-me bias, thereby concentrating
crowdfunding dollars on middle- to high-income beneficiaries. Early health care crowdfunding
literature highlights how donors gravitated toward high-income, homeowners, and highly
educated urban residents.92 Thus, while chronic disease campaigns, which are less discriminatory
based on income, should still see more crowdfunded dollars, campaigns to cover health needs for
low-income people should see less crowdfunded dollars.
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VII. Two hypotheses seek to match crowdfunding supply with demand.
In this section, I will synthesize the two hypotheses ultimately argue that healthcare
crowdfunding will help provide for only one of the two groups I identified as being most likely
to demand need. The limiting factor on the welfare-enhancing impacts of health care
crowdfunding is that donors make subjective assessments of need, and thus are likely to donate
to people who are like them.
The greatest demand for health care crowdfunding is concentrated among two segments
left inadequately insured by the private health insurance market. Because of market frictions in
contingent contracts, adverse selection, and moral hazard, the greatest demand for health care
crowdfunding belongs to low-income individuals in non-Medicaid expansion states and chronic
care patients.
Because individuals in non-Medicaid expansion states lack other alternatives for health
coverage, I assume that individuals who crowdfund for health care needs in non-Medicaid
expansion states are low-income. While this may be a broad generalization, this assumption is
reasonable, because non-Medicaid expansion states have higher uninsured rates and generally
have smaller state budgets.93 Moreover, many of the campaigns in non-Medicaid expansion
states in my dataset attribute the lack of insurance and income to explain why they need funding.
I will proceed then by equating campaigns in non-Medicaid expansion states as campaigns that
demand the most need among the low-income.
The supply for health care crowdfunding is subjective and biased by income differences.
Donors are motivated to give to either group’s demands based on value-alignment, efficacy,
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altruism, or warm glow effect. However, donors generally are not low-income. They generally
have disposable income. Moreover, donations are made based on subjective evaluations of need,
which are vulnerable to similar-to-me biases.
This creates two implications for the supply and demand dynamics for this market.
Because of the prevalence of chronic diseases, donors should still be more likely to give to
chronic diseases relative to their medical alternative – acute diseases, or short-term diseases –
regardless of income. However, because donors are less likely to be low-income, donors are less
likely to donate to low-income beneficiaries, denoted by their residency in non-Medicaid
expansion states, than those in Medicaid-expansion states.
Thus, I present two hypotheses:
1. Non-Medicaid expansion state health care crowdfunding campaigns will receive less
crowdfunding than Medicaid-expansion state campaigns.
2. Campaigns crowdfunding for chronic diseases will receive more crowdfunding than
campaigns crowdfunding for acute diseases.
VIII. Methodology
I use GoFundMe to build my health care crowdfunding dataset. Recent literature on
health care crowdfunding has a list of 42 donation-based health care crowdfunding platforms.94 I
narrow that list to platforms that are American-based companies, which result in 18 platforms.
Among them, I find only three platforms that focus primarily on individual health care
crowdfunding platforms: GoFundMe, GiveForward, and YouCaring. The other 15 platforms are
niche players that crowdfund for specific diseases or medical research. I choose GoFundMe as
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my source, because it is the largest and only remaining active platform. GoFundMe owns
YouCaring, which acquired GiveForward. As a result, YouCaring and GiveForward are both
deactivated.
On GoFundMe, I collect campaigns through the curated “Discover Medical Fundraisers”
(referenced as “Discover” moving forward) page and through keyword search results. The results
in “Discover” are ordered by their amount raised, limited in selection, and are thus not
representative of the population. The minimum amount raised among these campaigns is
$27,325. Given that all empirical studies in health care crowdfunding literature have campaigns
that raised nothing, this minimum indicates that the data is positively skewed. A concern from
this ordering process is that it could potentially perpetuate a momentum effect: Trending
campaigns continue to raise more money, while campaigns that lack traction continue to
underperform. Given the limited representativeness of “Discover,” I expand my data collection
through keyword searches on: Medical, Healthcare, Chronic, and Acute. “Chronic” and “Acute”
refer to chronic and acute diseases. These terms are chosen, because they are most relevant to the
scope of this research.
I collect 5,596 eligible campaigns after filtering for eligibility and duplicates. For
comparison, a previous study found 2,204 health care campaigns.95 I filter campaigns for
eligibility by checking that the parsed campaigns are crowdfunding for individual health care
needs of US-based residents. For example, some parsed campaigns were fundraising in euros,
with beneficiaries located in Australia, or crowdfunding for money to publish a book with
“Acute” in its title. These campaigns would be omitted from the dataset. Then, because some
campaigns appear in multiple search results, I omit the duplicate campaign. I leave the campaign
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that uses a more specific search term, such as “Chronic” or “Acute.” If the duplicates are found
within generic searches like “Healthcare,” “Medical,” or “Discover,” then I leave the first
campaign that shows up in the data organization process.
To evaluate the representativeness of the campaigns collected, I run a statistical analysis
in Table 1 to evaluate the spread of campaigns. I use Microsoft Excel to analyze the data. Three
of the four keyword searches have a at least one campaign that has a minimum amount raised of
$0. “Medical” has a minimum of $354. These numbers are lower than the minimum for
“Discover.” Additionally, the average raised for “Discover” is $50,485.19, which is more than
double its next highest average at $23,582.81 by “Medical.”
Table 1. Population summary statistics on the amount of money raised (n=5,596 campaigns)
Search:
N
MIN
Q1
Q2
Q3
MAX
AVG
STDEV

Discover
871
$ 27,325.00
$ 31,032.00
$ 37,840.00
$ 52,284.00
$ 884,686.00
$ 50,485.19
$ 51,589.72

Healthcare
779
$
0.00
$ 140.00
$ 1,250.00
$ 2,990.00
$ 97,235.00
$ 3,113.07
$ 7,184.20

Medical
865
$
354.00
$ 2,800.00
$ 7,750.00
$ 24,980.00
$ 433,512.00
$ 23,582.81
$ 43,266.39

Chronic
1523
$
0.00
$
110.00
$ 2,865.00
$ 12,890.00
$ 415,274.00
$ 12,372.71
$ 27,852.94

Acute
1558
$
0.00
$
2,456.25
$
7,245.00
$ 17,258.25
$ 1,800,000.00
$ 17,273.79
$ 65,280.37

I proceed to map the quartile-metrics onto a box-and-whiskers plot in Figure 1 to show that the
performance of the campaigns is heavily right-skewed across all five groups. There is a long
right tail with a highly concentrated portion of the campaigns falling around $100,000 across all
search terms. Thus, most campaigns raise very little, and outliers plague each group. This
observation is consistent with existing healthcare crowdfunding studies that conclude that only
some campaigns outperform, while most raise very little.
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Figure 1. Distributions are skewed right
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Looking individually at the distribution of each campaign’s performance within their
search term categories in Figure 2, I see that the distributions are random across different search
terms. Campaign ID has no relevance to the analysis at hand but rather refers to each campaign’s
row number in their respective Microsoft Excel tabs. My dependent variable is the amount raised
in dollars. For “Discover,” I observe a long right-hand tail to the data, which reinforces the
limitations to the “Discover” sample. For “Healthcare,” I observe a random distribution that has
two peaks that each raise about $100,000. I expect the distribution of “Medical” to be similar to
that of “Healthcare,” because of the similarities in their definitions. Instead, I observe much more
variation among the amounts raised for “Medical.” Thus, while the campaigns collected are all
health care crowdfunding campaigns, the two keywords produce very different distributions.
“Chronic” and “Acute” also have different distributions. “Chronic” ends with a long right-hand
tail, while “Acute” begins with a long left-hand tail in the distribution. Nonetheless, the varying
row heights that suggest different amounts raised do seem to show a randomness to the
collection of this subset.
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Figure 2. Campaign amount raised are randomly distributed across keywords
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Since the data is user self-reported, I assume that the data is accurate and representative
of the individual’s actual state. Campaigns are accurately marking the beneficiary’s health
condition as either “Acute” or “Chronic.” The campaigns reflect the location of where the
beneficiary is at. For example, a campaign identified to be in Pennsylvania will benefit a
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Pennsylvanian beneficiary. Thus, I assume that all the campaigns are making legitimate requests
that are reflective of what the beneficiary needs. While there are media stories covering
fraudulent healthcare crowdfunding campaigns, this is difficult to verify without the back-end
data from GoFundMe. Thus, I rely on GoFundMe’s enforcement of policies that punish
fraudulent activity on its platform to assume that the campaigns I get are accurate and legitimate.
Then, I use ParseHub, a web-based data scraping tool, to gather data on each campaign’s
location, amount raised, target amount, and number of donors, shares, followers, and donations. I
refer to the 2020 Kaiser Family Foundation data to identify non-Medicaid expansion states from
Medicaid expansion states.96 Consistent with most healthcare crowdfunding literature, I use the
amount raised as my primary dependent variable to track financial performance. I use the target
amount as a reference point for demand. Then, I use the number of donors, shares, followers, and
donations as dependent variables that can help suggest explanations for discrepancies in
performance.
I test for hypothesis 1 by acknowledging an implicit assumption and adding a new
dependent variable. I assume that people in non-Medicaid expansion states who are
crowdfunding for health care needs are low-income. Because state populations vary, I also
introduce a dollar per capita measurement to account for population differences.
I test for hypothesis 2 by sorting the campaigns by their respective keyword search
results. Thus, results found in the keyword search “Acute” are considered campaigns
crowdfunding for acute diseases.

96

“Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map,” 2020

Yang 54
IX: Results
In this section, I analyze the results of the data. I find supporting evidence that campaigns
in non-Medicaid expansion states raise less money than Medicaid-expansion states, because
people donate in higher amounts in expansion-states. Meanwhile, I find no supporting evidence
that campaigns crowdfunding for chronic diseases will raise more money. Instead, I find that
donors are more likely to donate to campaigns treating for acute diseases.
i. Hypothesis 1: Non-Medicaid expansion state health care crowdfunding campaigns will
receive less crowdfunding than Medicaid-expansion state campaigns.
I segment 5,596 campaigns using location as a dummy variable to determine whether the
campaign is in a Medicaid-expansion state or a non-expansion state. Including Washington DC,
the data represents 35 expansion-states out of 36 in total. All 15 non-expansion states are
represented in this data.
On an aggregate absolute basis, the data in Figure 3 show that expansion-states raise
more than non-expansion states. The total raised by expansion states is $87,223,723. The total
raised by non-expansion states is $24,924,775. Thus, campaigns in expansion states are getting
more in aggregate.
Even when accounting for completion rates within groups relative to the aggregate
amount they demand, expansion-states demand and get more crowdfunding dollars. To account
for the differences in demand across groups, I divide the sum of raised by the sum of goal.
Expansion-states demanded $683,828,430 and had an average completion rate of 64.67%. Nonexpansion states demanded $170,315,314 and had an average completion rate of 0.06%.
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Figure 3. Expansion states raise more than nonexpansion states (n=5,596)
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Despite showing differences in financial performance and number of campaigns, both
groups are relatively similar when considering the data in Table 2. The sample size difference
amounts to 2,106. Thus, the dataset may exhibit a skewness resulting from the unequal
proportion of campaigns. However, even with such a volume difference in campaigns and the
amount raised, the difference between the number of donors, followers, and donations are all
relatively small. The biggest discrepancy is in the aggregate number of shares within each group.
The difference amounts to 6,317,197. This is significant, as shares help beneficiaries raise
awareness and solicit for donations, which are important to driving donor behavior. However, the
impact of this difference is unclear, because the number of donors and donations made is
relatively similar with only a difference of 1,381.
The small difference in donor count and donations made suggests that people in nonexpansion states are likely donating less dollars per donation than people in expansion-states.
Theoretically, if people donate the same amount per donation, then the differences in the number
of donors and donations between expansion and non-expansion states should reflect differences
in amount raised. However, the data shows small differences in the numbers of donors and
donations. Moreover, the differences in social media performance seem relatively small. Even
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with the difference in shares, the number of shares seems to have a small effect on attracting
donors and donations. Meanwhile, the financial discrepancies are significant. Hence, this finding
suggests that the people in non-expansion states are just donating more money than those in
expansion-states.

Table 2. Expansion and non-expansion states are relatively similar in aggregate
Medicaid Expansion?

Expansion

Non-expansion

∆Exp-Non-exp

N
#donors
#shares
#followers

3,851
1254155
6318297
1303490

1,745
1252774
1100
1302062

2,106
1,381
6,317,197
1,428

#donations

1439052

1437493

1,559

However, states vary in population and thus, population differences may impact
performance. That is, small states hypothetically could have less people to donate to on an
absolute basis. And thus, there is less competition and spreading of limited financial resources.
Consequently, the small state may be donating more on a per capita basis.
I control for state population differences on campaign financial performance by creating
per capita metrics. I begin by aggregating how much is raised and demanded on a state-by-state
basis. I also use 2019 projections on state populations from the Census Bureau.97 I then divide
each respective financial sum with its corresponding state population to get a dollar amount per
capita metric. Finally, I use the “SUMPRODUCT” function in Microsoft Excel to calculate
average per capita metrics within each grouping by multiplying each state’s per capita metric
with the state population as a percentage of total group population.
Within Medicaid-expansion states, there is variability in performance as shown in Table
3.1. The average amount raised per capita is $0.40 while the average amount demanded per
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capita is $3.21. Massachusetts and New York have the most dollars raised per capita, at $0.79
and $0.74 respectively. Arkansas raise the least per capita at $0.06 and demand relatively little at
$0.34. This suggests that crowdfunding is not as prevalent in Arkansas as it is in other states.
New Mexico has the greatest discrepancy between amount raised and demanded. New Mexico
campaigns demand $238.79 per capita but only raise $0.11 per capita. Thus, while New Mexico
seems to have the greatest need, this need is not adequately met.
Within non-expansion states, Table 3.2 shows less inconsistencies in performance across
states. The dollar amount raised per capita is $0.21, while the dollar amount demanded per capita
is $1.50. Wyoming and Florida raise the most per capita, with $0.44 and $0.36 respectively.
South Carolina and Alabama raise the least per capita at $0.11 and $0.12 respectively; they also
demand the least. Thus, this suggests that crowdfunding for health care may not be as prevalent
within these two states. Wisconsin has the greatest difference between how much they need and
how much they get. Wisconsin demand $17.47 per capita but receive $0.16 per capita.
Thus on a per capita basis, expansion-states still raise more money than non-expansion
states. Figure 4 shows that the amount raised per capita for expansion and non-expansion states
is $0.40 and $0.21, respectively. This difference suggests that expansion states are spending
almost double of what non-expansion states spend per capita on crowdfunding to health care.

Figure 4. Expansion states raise more dollar
per capita than non-expansion states
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Table 3.1. Financial performance per capita for Medicaid-expansion states
Medicaid
Population
$raised per
Expansion? (2019)
Sum of raised
capita*
Sum of goal

$demanded per
capita*

Expansion

683,642,549

$

213,230,991

$

84,841,431

$

AK

731,545

$

317,371

$

0.43

$

803,000

$

1.10

AR

3,017,804

$

183,644

$

0.06

$

1,030,195

$

0.34

AZ

7,278,717

$

1,993,756

$

0.27

$

4,550,747

$

0.63

CA

39,512,223

$

18,878,893

$

0.48

$

36,623,750

$

0.93

CO

5,758,736

$

3,059,774

$

0.53

$

6,144,992

$

1.07

CT

3,565,287

$

1,808,564

$

0.51

$

3,411,232

$

0.96

DC

705,749

$

295,240

$

0.42

$

1,575,500

$

2.23

DE

973,764

$

408,424

$

0.42

$

1,408,300

$

1.45

HI

1,415,872

$

924,222

$

0.65

$

2,742,000

$

1.94

IA

3,155,070

$

508,850

$

0.16

$

804,700

$

0.26

ID

1,787,065

$

512,029

$

0.29

$

912,100

$

0.51

IL

12,671,821

$

3,969,808

$

0.31

$

7,424,716

$

0.59

IN

6,732,219

$

997,375

$

0.15

$

2,192,018

$

0.33

KY

4,467,673

$

582,432

$

0.13

$

1,905,900

$

0.43

LA

4,648,794

$

477,870

$

0.10

$

1,039,700

$

0.22

MA

6,892,503

$

5,410,736

$

0.79

$

6,857,160

$

0.99

MD

6,045,680

$

1,449,815

$

0.24

$

3,987,800

$

0.66

MI

9,986,857

$

2,519,601

$

0.25

$

5,649,027

$

0.57

MN

5,639,632

$

1,744,357

$

0.31

$

2,787,601

$

0.49

MT

1,068,778

$

312,613

$

0.29

$

539,500

$

0.50

ND

762,062

$

346,377

$

0.45

$

435,364

$

0.57

NH

1,359,711

$

469,258

$

0.35

$

935,900

$

0.69

NJ

8,882,190

$

4,887,278

$

0.55

$

10,151,147

$

1.14

NM

2,096,829

$

223,043

$

0.11

$

500,704,000

$

238.79

NV

3,080,156

$

910,540

$

0.30

$

2,369,620

$

0.77

NY

19,453,561

$

14,409,341

$

0.74

$

38,919,216

$

2.00

OH

11,689,100

$

2,132,938

$

0.18

$

4,194,910

$

0.36

OR

4,217,737

$

1,562,112

$

0.37

$

3,223,990

$

0.76

PA

12,801,989

$

4,374,655

$

0.34

$

6,517,447

$

0.51

RI

1,059,361

$

446,121

$

0.42

$

590,948

$

0.56

UT

3,205,958

$

1,774,457

$

0.55

$

3,802,550

$

1.19

VA

8,535,519

$

3,009,156

$

0.35

$

9,920,569

$

1.16

VT

0.40

$

3.21

623,989

$

407,630

$

0.65

$

461,200

$

0.74

WA

7,614,893

$

3,332,777

$

0.44

$

6,610,398

$

0.87

WV

1,792,147

$

200,374

$

0.11

$

2,415,352

$

1.35

*The greener the cell, the higher the dollar per capita amount. The redder the cell, the lower the dollar per capita amount.
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Table 3.2. Financial performance per capita for non-expansion states
Medicaid
Population
$raised per
Expansion?
(2019) Sum of raised
capita*
Sum of goal
Nonexpansion
113,664,320 $
24,364,689
$
0.21
$
170,833,285

$demanded per
capita
$

1.50

AL

4,903,185

$

605,775

$

0.12

$

1,179,690

$

0.24

FL

21,477,737

$

7,642,798

$

0.36

$

22,806,075

$

1.06

GA

10,617,423

$

1,531,852

$

0.14

$

13,341,410

$

1.26

KS

2,913,314

$

549,692

$

0.19

$

1,415,500

$

0.49

MO

6,137,428

$

835,777

$

0.14

$

1,643,244

$

0.27

MS

2,976,149

$

452,497

$

0.15

$

1,143,370

$

0.38

NC

10,488,084

$

1,842,530

$

0.18

$

4,857,960

$

0.46

NE

1,934,408

$

404,557

$

0.21

$

610,400

$

0.32

OK

3,956,971

$

842,771

$

0.21

$

2,126,250

$

0.54

SC

5,148,714

$

573,872

$

0.11

$

1,135,321

$

0.22

SD

884,659

$

127,595

$

0.14

$

313,700

$

0.35

TN

6,829,174

$

1,487,543

$

0.22

$

2,763,700

$

0.40

TX

28,995,881

$

6,296,510

$

0.22

$

15,243,198

$

0.53

WI

5,822,434

$

916,109

$

0.16

$

101,721,467

$

17.47

578,759

$

254,811

$

0.44

$

532,000

$

0.92

WY

ii. Hypothesis 2: Campaigns crowdfunding for chronic diseases will receive more
crowdfunding than campaigns crowdfunding for acute diseases.
I segment 3,081 campaigns using “Acute” and “Chronic” as the explanatory variables.
Then, I evaluate for the aggregate amounts the two groups raise on an absolute basis. If the
hypothesis finds supporting data, then campaigns on chronic diseases should be raising more
money than those on acute diseases.
On an aggregate absolute basis, the data in Figure 5 show that campaigns for acute
diseases raise more than those for chronic diseases. The total raised by acute diseases campaigns
is $31,616,031. The total raised by chronic disease campaigns is $23,314,407. Thus, on an
absolute aggregate basis, campaigns on acute diseases are raising more money.
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Figure 5. Acute diseases raised more than
chronic diseases (n=3,081)
$100,000,000.00

$Amt

$80,000,000.00
$60,000,000.00
$40,000,000.00
$20,000,000.00
$Sum of Raised
Acute

Sum of Goal

Chronic

Accounting for factors such as number of campaigns, shares, followers, and donations,
the data in Table 4 suggests that supply of donors is the greatest differentiator in performance. I
observe that the number of campaigns is roughly equal. The deltas across shares and followers
are relatively small. Acute gets 46,720 more donations, but that can be explained primarily due
to the stark advantage it has in attracting donors. The delta in donor count is 302,253; acute
campaigns are attracting almost double the number of donors that chronic campaigns are
attracting. Thus, there leads me to believe that crowdfunding performance for chronic and acute
conditions are less reliant on marketing effort or the condition itself, but rather on the availability
of donors in your network.
Table 4. Performance of acute and chronic disease
campaigns
Category
n
#donors

Acute

Chronic

∆Acute-Chronic

#shares
#followers

1,523
653,161
1,827,892
313,556

1,558
350,908
1,802,004
366,949

-35
302,253
25,888
-53,393

#donations

350,444

397,164

-46,720

Yang 61
X: Discussion
In this section, I will synthesize my empirical findings, then propose an alternative
explanation that explains the results I gathered. I proceed to discussing the three key limitations
to the research an propose what an ideal research would look like. I end with a reflection on
personal takeaways from this research.
To synthesize, the data supports the first hypothesis and rejects the second hypothesis. As
a result, both indicate that health care crowdfunding is not necessarily serving groups with the
greatest need for alternative health care financing.
The first hypothesis is supported by the data. The first hypothesis predicts that campaigns
in non-expansion states will raise less money than that expansion states. The data show that on a
per capita basis, Medicaid-expansion states raise $0.40, and non-expansion states raise $0.21.
Thus, this hypothesis does find supporting evidence within the data.
This finding is consistent with existing health care crowdfunding research that suggests
that health care crowdfunding perpetuates socioeconomic divisions, because of their reliance on
social media networks. Crowdfunding relies on social media networks. This reliance on social
networks perpetuates the socioeconomic divides already existent in social networks. The
socioeconomic divisions pervade online health care crowdfunding, because low-income people
will likely have networks that are also low-income.98 The opposite is also true. Studies have
found that health care crowdfunding usage is positively correlated with high income, home
ownership, and high educational attainment.99 As a result, it seems like the rich will continue to
give to the rich, while the poor will again be left out by this market. The socioeconomically

98
99

Snyder, 2016
Duynhoven, et al., 2019
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disadvantaged are more likely to be excluded from reaping the benefits of the growing health
care crowdfunding market.100 Thus, rather than increasing access to health care, health care
crowdfunding seems to perpetuate existing socioeconomic divisions.
The second hypothesis is not supported by the data. The second hypothesis predicts that
campaigns covering chronic diseases will raise more money than that of acute diseases. The data
do not support this hypothesis. Despite no significant differences in social media performance
and in the volume of campaigns, acute conditions are significantly more successful than chronic
campaigns. The finding is explained by the difference in the number of donors, with 653,151
donors going to acute campaigns, and 350,908 donors going to acute campaigns. The difference
equals 302,253, thus showing that acute campaigns are attracting almost double the number of
donors that chronic campaigns are attracting.
An implication for this finding is that based on the data, people are not necessarily
crowdfunding health care expenses for significant long-term health conditions. Instead, health
care crowdfunding is reserved for more acute, one-off, unexpected health conditions. This
suggests that health care crowdfunding is not primarily used as a long-term solution.
A potential theory to explain the findings for the second hypothesis could be the role of
efficacy-driven donors. Donors are subjective, and thus determine their own standards for
efficacy. If the standards are likelihood of success in treatment, then chronic conditions are less
attractive. Chronic conditions take a long time to treat. Diseases like diabetes are manageable but
inevitably untreatable. Thus, efficacy-driven donors that care about maximizing the impact of

100

Lukk et al., 2018
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their donation will likely donate to acute campaigns. The findings would then suggest that
efficacy plays a significant role in health care crowdfunding.
This alternative theory does not violate the first hypothesis. An impact-maximizing
efficacy-driven donor may donate to campaigns by higher income beneficiaries, because
donating to them may have a greater impact. At the very least, their campaigns are more likely to
succeed. Health care crowdfunding literature suggests that higher income people run more
successful campaigns. Thus, efficacy-driven donors may feel like their contribution will be better
served giving a small amount to a campaign that is likely to succeed as opposed to giving a large
amount but still falling short.
However, the implications for this explanation have serious welfare concerns about the
inefficient allocation of private donations. Charitable giving literature talks about how donations
are made subjectively and based on perception. Thus, the impact-maximization utility function
that efficacy-driven donors, who are likely not low-income, are likely to be colored by their
socioeconomic background. And because these donations are subjective, there studies in
charitable giving literature show that people donate inefficiently.101 Health care crowdfunding
market studies echo a similar concern. Donors left to their own devices act as a negative
externality in potentially inhibiting broader public health goals.102 Thus, at face value, a lot of
money is going into health care crowdfunding. However, these efforts are just letting those with
better resources to donate to people in similar socioeconomic classes. And they keep donating to
those people, because they are not necessarily interested in broader public health goals. But,
because of this absolute inflow of capital into health care crowdfunding, health care

101
102

Null, 2011
Renwick and Mossialos, 2017
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crowdfunding may ostensibly be the prevailing solution to get funding for health care expenses.
In turn, this perception may adversely impact efforts to achieve broader public health goals that
aim to offer a long-term and structural solution.
Aside from these implications, I acknowledge that there are three key limitations to this
thesis: sample representativeness, confounding variables, and lack of qualitative analysis.
First, despite creating a relatively large and randomly distributed sample, I am limited in
the representativeness of the sample. I was limited in the amount of campaigns I could scrape
from each GoFundMe search, because of GoFundMe’s algorithms. Moreover, I was not able to
capture how timing impacts campaign performance. Aside from the campaigns constantly
updating in near real-time when a donation is made, timing can impact the context and subjective
priorities that people are likely to donate to. I tried to minimize time differences by conducting
the searches concurrently in one sitting, but I was not able to find campaigns created in 2010,
before the ACA passed. Perhaps those campaigns could show how the supply and demand
changed over time. Thus, the campaigns I did collect represents the state of searchable
campaigns in January 28, 2020.
Second, because I lack backend user data from GoFundMe, I cannot control for some
confounding variables. For example, while I use location to segment expansion and nonexpansion states, then use that as a proxy for income of the beneficiaries, I acknowledge that
there are limitations to this assumption. Moreover, while I was not able to control for income in a
similar manner as in hypothesis 1 with hypothesis 2, where income may play a role in accessing
treatment for chronically ill patients. I was unable to account for income in evaluating the second
hypothesis, because I did not account for location data when I conducted my initial analysis for
hypothesis 2. If I had more time, I would have conducted this analysis to see how the state of
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Medicaid-expansion impacts chronic and acute campaign performance through a PivotTable.
Moreover, if I had user data from GoFundMe, then perhaps I could have controlled for zip code,
gender, race, and other potentially confounding variables to increase my control on these
variables’ impact on socioeconomic status and campaign performance.
Third, due to feasibility constraints, I was not able to conduct a qualitative analysis on the
narratives. In future studies, I would do a qualitative analysis on a sample of the campaigns to
understand the difference in quality of the campaigns. My research currently assumes that the
quality of all the campaigns are the same, on average, within their groupings. However, it is
likely that higher-income people are better at marketing their cause, and thus more successful in
crowdfunding. This would be an interesting hypothesis to test with a qualitative analysis for
future studies.
Acknowledging these limitations, an ideal research design for this thesis would have
included the following parts. First, using back-end user meta-data, I would have been able to use
a PivotTable on Microsoft Excel to identify donors and beneficiary’s based on zip code and other
indicators that suggest their income level. Then, I would scrape all possible health care
crowdfunding campaigns on GoFundMe from 2009 to 2019. I want to consider the impact of the
ACA on chronic conditions and low-income individuals. Moreover, I want to see how the health
care crowdfunding market evolved across time, because support for my two hypotheses could
have varied depending on context. Perhaps, before the ACA was implemented, chronic
conditions were more likely to get crowdfunding. Next, I would conduct a similar quantitative
analysis evaluating the two hypotheses. However, I would also add in a qualitative component,
by running a small experiment in which donors are asked to evaluate their desirability to donate
to a variety of health care crowdfunding campaigns. An interview would follow the experiment
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to gather behavioral insights on subjective perception of need. I will combine the findings from
the qualitative with that of the quantitative to draw conclusions on this research. Such an ideal
experimental would require extensive time, coordination with GoFundMe to potentially violate
user privacy laws, and funding. Thus, this would have been infeasible given my current
circumstances.
Nonetheless, these findings have made me question my belief in the private provision for
basic goods. As someone entering the private sector, I believe in the impact individuals can make
by giving to help others left behind by the broken healthcare system. I am attracted to the
operational efficiency of the private sector and believe that private sector innovation can be used
to do good. Thus, I started this research thinking that crowdfunding platforms could more allow
individuals who want to do good to provide for basic structural health care gaps in our society. I
thought that health care crowdfunding could help those most underserved by the private and
public markets. While I do find that some people are contributing to help those in great need, my
empirical analysis also suggests that these donors make up the minority. Thus, I think my
understanding of how individuals can make impact through the private sector has become more
nuanced. While the platforms and products themselves have the potential to do good,
coordination is still required to bring that potential to fruition.
XI: Conclusion
As more Americans turn to health care crowdfunding as a means of financing their
burdensome health care costs, this thesis finds that crowdfunding is not a sustainable solution.
Crowdfunding dollars are less likely to go to low-income individuals in non-Medicaid expansion
states, because socioeconomic divisions in real-life and ingrained into online social networks,
which crowdfunding platforms rely on. Moreover, crowdfunding dollars are less likely to go to
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chronic disease campaigns, thus suggesting that health care crowdfunding is more functional in
raising money for short-term medical conditions.
This thesis provides one main contribution to the charitable giving literatures. This thesis
contributes to charitable giving literature, by being the first paper to draw upon the theoretical
foundation of charitable giving to explain the health care crowdfunding phenomenon. This thesis
contextualizes a modern and novel medium of charitable giving within a more extensive and
historical body of literature that studies American charity.
Moreover, this thesis contributes to the health care crowdfunding literature, by being the
first study to identify and test whether the growing health care crowdfunding market is correcting
for the market failures of the modern private health insurance market. Previous studies have
focused on performance within specific medical needs like cancer treatments or transgender
surgeries. However, this study takes a step back to broadly evaluate whether chronic diseases
like cancer are getting more crowdfunding dollars in the first place. I find that chronic diseases,
given the limitations of my research, are raising more funds than acute diseases.
This research can be extended in three ways. First, I would be interested in seeing if a
qualitative analysis or a controlled lab experiment would render different results in hypotheses
testing the same hypotheses. Next, I would be interested in evaluating the role of perceived
efficacy in motivating donation behavior to health care. What motivates people to decide that
their donation to a certain cause will maximize the efficacy of their donation? Third, I would be
interested in seeing whether income or the nature of the medical condition itself drives giving
activity. That is, between the two groups that most need crowdfunding, which get more
crowdfunding and why?
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I conclude this thesis by joining the early health care crowdfunding researchers in calling
for policy makers to not rely on health care crowdfunding as a means of solving the American
health care problem. Crowdfunding markets are uncoordinated and perpetuate socioeconomic
divisions that already limit care in the current private insurance market. Structural health care
reform, coordinated by the government, is still necessary, because health care crowdfunding is
not a sustainable nor equitable solution.
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